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China’s Foreign Aid Policy and
Architecture
Lan Xue*
Abstract As China’s engagement in low-income countries has deepened, particularly in Africa, so has
criticism of China’s development programmes and practices. New developments in Africa and the
international aid architecture warrant a re-examination of China’s foreign assistance and development
architecture, and its capacity in managing this growing engagement. This article outlines the modes of
Chinese foreign assistance, the institutional arrangements and the principles that guide it. It argues that,
while China’s foreign aid has been characterised by several strengths, including its practical orientation, its
consistency of principles, and its focus on high-level exchanges, these same features may also be fault lines
for both the future effectiveness of China’s aid programmes, and its international reputation as a rising
power in development. Evaluation and future reform of China’s aid architecture is needed in order to
enhance China’s aid capacity and effectiveness.
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1 Introduction
China’s foreign aid, particularly in Africa, has
attracted considerable international attention in
recent years. China’s aid programme has been
praised for its efficiency and implementation,
when contrasted to the cumbersome processes
traditionally associated with overseas
development assistance, and for its capacity for
technology transfer. For African governments
disillusioned with the Western development
model, China’s development expertise gives
them hope of a new path for development.
However, China’s aid programme has also
received much criticism from the international
development community and from civil society,
who have argued that China’s aid is driven by the
need for energy and raw materials, and that
China neglects human rights issues and
governance in recipient countries. The lack of
transparency around China’s aid and also
problems of local hostility towards Chinese
workers and companies are also ongoing
problems with China’s aid delivery.
While these criticisms do not represent the
entirety of China’s aid programme, they do
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Figure 1 Sectoral distribution of projects overseas completed with the help of China (by the end of 2009)
Source Author’s own data sourced from China Commerce Yearbook.1
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Figure 2 China foreign assistance projects in Africa (2003–06)
Source Author’s own data sourced from China Commerce Yearbook.2
9% Equipment item
3% Communication
3% Others
42% Public
construction
17% Culture,
education and
public health
2% Well digging
4% Sports
3% Water resources and power
11% Transportation
1% Broadcasting and telecommunication
2% Agriculture project
3% Industry project
1Intro IDSB45.4.qxd  24/06/2014  10:41  Page 37
indicate fault lines that, left unchecked, may
reduce the effectiveness of China’s aid and hurt
the long-term potential for China–Africa
cooperation. With the rapid expansion of China’s
aid to Africa, there is a need to re-examine China’s
current aid architecture and capacity, as well as its
conceptual principles. New developments in Africa
and the international aid market also present
challenges to the current practice of China’s aid.
These emerging issues warrant a systematic
examination of China’s current aid architecture
and standards. This article, based on an
International Development Research Centre
(IDRC)-funded report of the same title, outlines
the modes of Chinese foreign assistance, the
institutional arrangements and the principles that
guide it. It argues that, while China’s foreign aid
has been characterised by several strengths,
including its practical orientation, its consistency
of principles, and its focus on high-level exchanges,
these same features may also become weaknesses
for both the future effectiveness of China’s aid
programmes, as well as its international
reputation as a rising power in development.
Evaluation and future reform of China’s aid
architecture is urgently needed, in order to
enhance China’s aid capacity and effectiveness.
2 China’s aid and technical assistance
The first official relationships between China and
African countries began in 1956, when China
established diplomatic relations with Egypt, and
sent assistance through loans and volunteers
during the Suez Crisis (Chen 2008). In the
subsequent half-century, China’s aid to African
countries has made major strides. Since the late
1990s, the scale of China’s partnership with Africa
has expanded to involve a network of trade, aid
and investment with over 50 African countries.
China provides aid mainly in the form of
technical assistance (see Figures 1 and 2), with
an emphasis on training, grants, interest-free
loans and preferential loans that have an interest
subsidy and debt relief. Simultaneously, China
has largely eliminated tariffs on exports from 29
of the least developed African countries, and has
become a source of foreign direct investment to
Africa. As of 2006, China’s existing loans and
credit lines to Africa are estimated to total about
US$19 billion (author’s own data based on China
Commerce Yearbook figures).3 The beneficiaries of
the largest flows are Angola, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, the Republic of Congo and Nigeria.
Much of this assistance has been funnelled into
projects for economic and social infrastructure
such as roads, telecommunications, hospitals and
health-care delivery; knowledge-sharing,
including government scholarship programmes
for 50 African countries; the productive sector,
notably agriculture; and construction, including
government buildings and sports stadiums.
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Figure 3 China’s foreign technical assistance projects in Africa (2003–06)
Source Author’s own data sourced from China Commerce Yearbook.4
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Figures 3 and 4 show China’s foreign technical
assistance projects by sector from 2003 to 2006.
3 China’s aid institutions
At the core of China’s foreign aid system are three
ministries. The Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) is the lead government agency
responsible for China’s foreign aid. Two sub-
divisions manage foreign aid-related work: the
Department of Aid to Foreign Countries (DAFC),
which comprises approximately 100 staff, with
20–30 working mainly on Africa (Davies, Edinger,
Tay and Naidu 2008); and the Executive Bureau
of International Economic Cooperation (EBIEC),
which is organised as a public service unit to
execute and implement the policies made at DAFC.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) drafts
and coordinates China’s foreign policy under the
central government. It plays an advisory role to
MOFCOM on foreign aid, and works with
MOFCOM in shaping specific aid packages, as
well as organising major exchange events such as
the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC). Finally the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) drafts China’s foreign aid budget in
consultation with MOFCOM and MOFA, as well
as being the contact agency for international
financial institutions such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
responsible for multilateral aid distributed
through these channels.
Beyond the ministerial level, however, several
institutional actors are also involved in foreign aid
operations. These include central government
agencies such as health and education; local
government agencies; and Chinese embassies
through the Economic and Commercial
Counsellor’s offices. The Export-Import Bank of
China also plays a special role in providing
Chinese government concessionary loans, as well
as promoting an open and export-oriented
economy through trade financing (Davies et al.
2008). Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Chinese
enterprises, public and private; hospitals;
educational institutions; NGOs; and other
organisations are involved in on-the-ground
delivery of aid projects in Africa, which is
managed through a certification process by DAFC.
Major decisions related to foreign aid are usually
made at the top level of the Chinese government,
through the Central Working Group on Foreign
Affairs, chaired by the president and vice
president, and including the vice premier, state
councillors and other relevant ministries. General
policies and plans for foreign aid are drafted
between the three major ministries, who have a
working coordination mechanism on foreign aid;
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Figure 4 China’s foreign technical assistance projects (2003–06)
Source Author’s own data sourced from China Commerce Yearbook.5
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other working mechanisms also operate across
and within other ministries and within ministries
working on different aspects of foreign aid.
Much of China’s engagement has been with
African governments, conducted state to state
through high-level visits and exchanges: from
2000–06, over 200 high-level visits took place
between China and African countries (Horizon
Group 2008). Summit diplomacy has been a
unique feature of the China–Africa relationship.
Such high-level visits not only improve
understanding between China and African
countries on important issues, they have also
become opportunities to initiate or cement
foreign aid projects, and the signing of major aid
agreements almost always involves exchange of
high-level visits.
The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), established in 2000, has become an
important mechanism for engaging in collective
dialogue and cooperation between China and
African countries. The third FOCAC, held in
Beijing in November 2006, was a landmark in
China’s foreign aid relations with Africa, bringing
representatives of 53 African countries to China,
and the announcement of China’s expansion of
foreign aid and assistance to Africa. The fourth
FOCAC was held in Egypt in November 2009,
and the fifth and most recent FOCAC ministerial
meeting was held in Beijing in July 2012. The
forum has also become an important platform in
extending ‘summit diplomacy’ to ‘people
diplomacy’ through the involvement of NGOs and
business people in these forums; since the second
forum, joint business conferences have become a
regular feature.
China has also been active in Africa’s regional
organisations, sending representatives and
observers to the African Union (AU) summit in
2006. China is also a board member of the
African Development Bank (AfDB) and other
regional development banks. In May 2007 the
AfDB had its board meeting in Shanghai, the
first such meeting in China and only the second
time when it was held outside Africa.
4 The principles of China’s aid
As a developing country itself, China has built its
foreign aid programme on the idea of mutual
benefit and co-development. This was outlined in
‘China’s African Policy’, released by MOFA in
2006, which emphasises principles of mutuality
in friendship and cooperation, mutual benefits
and common prosperity, and in mutual learning
and development (MOFA 2006). By far the most
comprehensive policy document on the China–
Africa relationship, this document outlines four
broad areas of collaboration: political; economic;
education and technology; and finally peace and
security. As well as emphasising principles of
non-conditionality in aid, the document is also
interesting in its explicit endorsement of
international collaboration towards the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
In 2011 China released a White Paper on Foreign
Aid. The paper outlines a number of principles,
which draws from China’s foreign policy
principles of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, emphasising
non-interference and non-conditionality, as well
as the importance of mutual help and benefit.
The principles also emphasise ‘self-development’
for recipient countries, framing foreign aid as a
means for recipients to generate their own path
to development independently.
5 China’s aid architecture: strengths and
weaknesses
5.1 A practical development model
Several distinctive features stand out in China’s
aid architecture and practice. Firstly, China’s aid
to developing countries, particularly to Africa,
has had a strong practical orientation. Aid to
Africa was initially used during the 1950–70s as a
tool of foreign policy. Projects during this period
focused very much on the immediate needs of
African countries, infrastructure development,
medical service, technical assistance in
agriculture and so forth. While some major
projects went beyond China’s financial means at
the time, many of the tangible outcomes became
symbols of China’s friendship with African
countries. This pragmatism continued as China
shifted its aid policy towards Africa in the late
1970s and in the late 1990s. China’s domestic
policy agenda made economic reform and
development the top priority and mutual benefit
and economic engagement became an important
objective of foreign aid practice. Foreign aid
began to reflect this new trend in promoting
economic cooperation between China and
African countries. Many of the companies
involved in implementing the aid projects have
accumulated substantial operational experience
in African countries, which has proven valuable
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for their international reputation and growth,
and in engagement in other commercial projects
in developing countries (Horizon Group 2008).
This practical orientation means that China’s
foreign aid in general is not driven by a
conceptual model of development, nor has China
made much effort in generating such a model.
Indeed, high-level Chinese government officials
often remind their counterparts in Africa of the
need to find their own way in developing their
economy when they visit China and try to learn
from China’s experiences. China’s development
experiences have never been synthesised into a
model, which contrasts with traditional Western
donors, who put more emphasis on programme
designs with articulated objectives based on
certain conceptual models of development.
Chinese government agencies involved in foreign
aid, on the other hand, do not have a fixed model
on how foreign aid should be done and rely
heavily on their practical experiences in China.
This lack of dogma in China’s development
practice has been a strength in its foreign aid
engagement, and makes them flexible and willing
to accommodate the specific need of the recipient
countries. However, the fact that, despite over 50
years of foreign aid practice, China still does not
have a well-articulated model for its development
assistance is also a significant flaw to its reputation
and its aid effectiveness. One drawback to the
heavily practical orientation of China’s foreign aid,
and the absence of a guiding theoretical model, is
the lack of substantive and systematic research on
development in this area. One issue is the lack of
the consistent data necessary for such research.
While there is evidence of the role China’s foreign
aid and engagement has played in, for example,
Africa’s rapid economic development, there is still
a need for a coherent understanding of how
China’s foreign aid has worked, how China’s aid
differs from that of existing donors, and to what
degree China’s foreign aid is competitive or
complementary to that of existing donors. Greater
research and attention to the distinctive features
of China’s development assistance model can also
enrich our understanding of the wider
development process.
5.2 Fragmented aid institutions
The practical orientation of China’s aid has led to
the development of an aid architecture that
supports such practice. As discussed, the overall
policy direction on foreign aid is determined by a
high-level working group in the central
government. However, translating such general
direction into policies that can be implemented
relies heavily on MOFCOM, which, in turn, has to
work closely with economic and commercial
offices in embassies in African countries to
identify and select the right projects, and to
coordinate with relevant ministries to ensure that
these projects are implemented with appropriate
support and supervision. The common objective of
the relevant institutions and working mechanisms
are all geared towards tangible projects.
MOFCOM has been trying in recent years to
improve existing and develop new regulations
and standards related to the development and
execution of projects. However, like most
Chinese government agencies, the analytical
capability within MOFCOM is relatively weak,
and numbers of personnel working in
development aid is low. It does not have the
capacity nor the incentive to analyse the success
and failure of the projects it has supported in a
systematic way and to develop a coherent
strategy for aid to Africa.
There is also a risk of overload in the foreign aid
system, due to the problems and complexities of
coordinating competing policy objectives. China’s
aid across the globe has increased dramatically
over the last decade. In 2006 Chinese President
Hu Jintao announced a plan to provide
US$5 billion in preferential credits and establish
a US$5 billion development fund to encourage
and support investment by Chinese companies in
Africa. These new plans have added to the
workload of the relevant government agencies,
with little significant change to the operations
mode or substantial personnel increases, which
puts the effective implementation of much of
China’s aid and investment policies at risk.
Moreover, as China’s aid broadens in nature, the
horizontal fragmentation of development and aid
responsibilities between government agencies
increase transaction and coordination costs. As
differing government agencies may also have
competing policy objectives, dispersion of aid
responsibilities puts further strain on the efficacy
of the system.
This problem of fragmentation also goes beyond
state organs. As global engagement has increased,
as has the diversity of other Chinese organisations
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and businesses operating internationally. It is
simply impossible for the government to monitor
or regulate the activities of all these organisations,
all of which have their own agendas and interests.
However, for Africa and the developing world, all
actors still reflect China and the Chinese
government, who is perceived to be responsible for
them. Wrongdoings by a single organisation
generate significant negative externalities for the
state and other Chinese organisations engaged in
developing countries, despite the fact that they
may be operating independently.
5.3 Consistent aid principles
A major feature of China’s foreign aid practice is
that despite the policy shifts over the years in
China’s foreign aid, the general principles that
guide foreign aid practice have remained
remarkably consistent since the Five Principles
proposed by Zhou Enlai in 1953. China outlined its
‘African Policy’ in 2006, based on the same
principles of equal treatment, respect for
sovereignty, non-interference, mutual benefit and
co-development (Li 2007: 74). Non-interference as
a principle has proven controversial. For many
Western countries, international aid is an effective
tool to force African countries to move towards
‘good governance’ and ‘democracy’, in addition to
other conditions, such as environmental standards,
that are often attached to the aid provision. China’s
refusal to impose political conditions in its foreign
aid has been seen as a threat to the effectiveness of
these tools (Thompson 2005; Gill, Huang and
Morrison 2007).
China’s stance in this regard has been most
welcomed by developing countries and China’s
aid is often used by African countries as a kind of
leverage in their negotiations with Western
donors. However, China’s endorsement of these
principles should not be read as an intent to
undermine Western donors’ aid strategy. China’s
lack of political conditionality stems in part from
its particular historical experience of Western
colonialism, as well as its own experience of
political conditionality as a recipient of Soviet aid.
These historical experiences have conditioned
China’s principles of non-interference, but China
also upholds the belief that developing countries
face complex challenges in development that no
other country has solutions to. In cases of
humanitarian crisis, China often relies on the
judgement of legitimate regional or international
organisations and joins such multilateral
initiatives in addressing these issues in peaceful,
non-coercive approaches.
Despite the benign rationale for the principle of
non-conditionality, it has been one of the most
controversial and most criticised aspects of
China’s foreign aid. As China and other ‘new
donors’ in developing countries intensify their
international aid activities, the ‘traditional
donors’ have also stepped up their monitoring of
activities by these new donors, and attempted to
align them with existing consensus on aid
principles as embodied in the Paris Declaration
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Development
Assistance Committee (DAC). China’s principle
of not attaching political conditions to its foreign
aid is attacked when such aid is provided to
governments that are considered corrupt and
authoritarian, as non-conditionality is thus read
as tacit endorsement. Environmental standards,
employment of local labour and so on are also
issues of concern in Africa, as well as Southeast
Asia, and China’s neglect of these issues hurts its
credibility. While relevant government agencies
have explained its rationale in adherence to the
principles and practices, these arguments have
not been compelling enough to reduce the
critical voices, and the case of Darfur has only
made things worse (Gill et al. 2007).
5.4 High-level exchanges
In international relations, summit diplomacy can
often play unique roles in building trust and
generating breakthroughs (Heap 2008). Analysts
have noted that major meetings or ‘summit
diplomacy’ between the Chinese and leaders of
developing countries have been critical to
establishing direct communication at the highest
levels of government, setting the tone of relations
and bilateral policies, and creating mutual trust
and respect between heads of state (Li 2007). For
example, for almost 20 years since 1991, Africa
has been the destination of the Chinese foreign
minister’s first foreign visit. Major policy changes
and aid projects are often announced during these
high-level visits. The most recent summit visits by
Chinese President Xi Jinping were to Tanzania,
South Africa and the People’s Republic of Congo
in March 2013. During President Xi’s visit to
these African countries, he reiterated China’s
commitment to Africa, promised to continue to
increase China’s aid to Africa and signed a set of
documents on aid and cooperation.6
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Though great significance has been placed on high-
level visits and exchanges, mutual understanding
and engagement on a societal level between China
and other developing countries has been very
shallow, partly due to the great differences in
culture, religion and geographical distances.
Compared with the frequent summit meetings
between Chinese and African leaders, academic
and cultural exchanges remain very limited, and
important high-level exchanges have not translated
into broader societal and cultural exchange.
Chinese art and cultural exchange programmes
are criticised for not adapting to target local
populations, and in both China and African
countries, media portrayal and public perceptions
are still somewhat distorted and framed by
stereotypes. The slow development of NGOs and
civil society in China also puts constraints on
further grassroots exchanges between those in
China and other developing countries.
Academic research and information is also
lacking: while in Western institutions, studies on
Africa have been increasing in recent years in
light of China’s intensifying engagement, such
systematic and in-depth studies are still lacking
within China, and research institutions generally
rely on Western data and original research.
General information and cultural understanding
on Africa is also lacking within China, and
alongside poor media portrayal, online
interactions between China and Africa over the
internet are also weak.
6 Emerging challenges in China’s foreign aid
landscape
These distinctive features of Chinese aid have
played an important role in building China’s
success and reputation as a foreign aid actor.
However, as African development has been
ascending rapidly as a global agenda issue, the
landscape of international aid has also changed.
The political and economic environment in
African and other developing countries are also
experiencing fundamental change, and as
China’s engagement with developing countries
deepens, there are also increasingly diversified
and sometimes competing interests among
different government agencies, major public
enterprises, small private entrepreneurs, NGOs
and other groups. Managing these growing pains
in China’s engagement with Africa and other
developing countries also poses new challenges.
The aid architecture that has worked well during
the past half-century needs to adapt to meet
these new challenges.
6.1 Perception of China as a new petropower
Despite China’s broad engagement with Africa,
engagement with Angola, Nigeria and Zimbabwe
has received particular attention, partly because
these countries are considered as very corrupt and
politically unstable, as well as being resource-rich.
Such perceptions have permeated throughout
some African and other countries and seriously
damaged popular attitudes to China, most notably
in Zambia, where the 2006 elections saw a
candidate stand on an explicit and critical anti-
China, anti-India platform (Davies et al. 2008), and
issues of labour rights and environmental standards
continue to cause tension. The lack of engagement
with African civil society exaserbates the situation.
A telling example is the result of a media survey
conducted by the School of Journalism and
Communication of Tsinghua University during the
Beijing Olympics in 2008. The survey found that in
Olympics reports from different regions around
the world, Africa showed the highest level of
negative reporting (56 per cent).7
6.2 Risk management in developing countries
Though China’s engagement with Africa is
growing rapidly, the risks and realities of political
instability in such developing states must still be
recognised and managed. Though China’s ‘Going
Global’ policy has mainly driven the expansion of
its larger firms and corporations, much of the
new investment and commerce in developing
countries in Africa have come from small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and private
entrepreneurs. These small enterprises are not
directed by the state, and often face large
information asymmetries and lack local
knowledge when trying to operate in developing
countries. Aside from local Chinese embassies,
there are few other information channels to
guide their transition or operations abroad.
7 Reforming China’s foreign aid: some
recommendations
Given the rapid expansion of China’s foreign aid
and investment activities in Africa and the
developing world, from both the state and
business sector, there is a risk of overload to its aid
institutions, as well as risks to China’s credibility
and reputation as a development actor and as a
rising power. There is a need to strengthen and
consolidate China’s aid institutions, to better
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define China’s aid model and principles, and to
facilitate more active engagement with the
international community and with African societies.
Create a working committee on international aid at
the State Council level to enhance policy development
and coordination 
As China’s international aid budget grows, there is
an urgent need for better policy development and
coordination. At the State Council level, the
creation of a working committee on international
aid with a substantive and relatively independent
secretariat would raise the profile of international
aid and enhance policy development and
coordination. The secretariat should have core
research capability so that it can provide analytical
support for policy development and evaluation on
China’s foreign aid, developing the capability to
survey the field and make use of the existing
literature and in order to distil policy lessons. One
necessary function for the secretariat would be the
development of a consolidated databank, which
currently does not exist, that would account for all
of China’s foreign aid activities.
It is possible that within the not-too-distant
future, this secretariat, along with DAFC in
MOFCOM, could evolve into a Chinese
international development agency with a
substantive aid budget (Chinese CIDA),
paralleling the development of such agencies in
most developed countries with its own substantial
aid budget (USAID in the USA; DFID in the UK;
CIDA in Canada; JICA in Japan and so forth).
Among the ‘new donors’, South Korea has already
established an international aid agency, the Korea
International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), in
1991. China’s decentralised and fragmented aid
institutions are still behind in this regard.
Establish thematic programmes in implementing
China’s foreign aid 
China’s foreign aid includes grant aid, interest-free
or concessionary loans, and assistance for joint
ventures or cooperation. These aid programmes
are provided mostly in the form of projects which
are typically generated in a bottom-up fashion. As
China’s aid programmes have expanded rapidly in
recent years, China needs to establish some
thematic programmes in either DAFC or EBIEC,
to complement the bottom-up process. Such
thematic programmes can help to better align aid
projects with policy objectives, improve the
coherence of aid projects, and create learning
opportunities to build capacity within DAFC and
EBIEC in specific aid fields. In the long run, it
might be a good idea to shift all grant aid to
thematic programmes to maximise the policy impact.
Engage actively with the existing international aid
community through dialogue, understanding and
cooperation 
In the international development market, China
does not have the baggage some of the Western
colonial powers carry, to its advantage. However,
in a globalised world, China’s increased foreign
aid activity will generate significant impacts for
the aid activities of the existing international aid
community. Engaging the existing international
aid community offers China new opportunities to
learn from the experiences of the traditional
donors and collaborate with them to generate
greater positive impact. This does not mean
China need necessarily subscribe to the existing
rules and regulations set by traditional donors. In
recent years, there have been increasing
collaborations between Chinese international aid
agencies and the existing international aid
community. For example, the World Bank and the
China EximBank signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) in 2007 aimed at
enhancing collaboration on road and energy
investment projects in Uganda, Ghana and
Mozambique. Future active engagement through
dialogue, understanding and cooperation provides
opportunities for Chinese aid agencies and
scholars to better articulate China’s aid position
and deflect criticism, as well as an opportunity to
also shape current Western practices of aid.
Create a group of interdisciplinary research centres for
regional studies in Chinese universities 
There is currently a pressing need for China to
develop its own research capabilities in different
regions of the world, including Africa. Traditionally,
such work was mostly done in the language
departments of different universities, as well as by
relevant research institutes in the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (CASS). China’s expanded
engagement across the world requires a new
generation of scholars with regional and linguistic
experience, as well as research proficiency in
interdisciplinary social science research in these
regions. The establishment of a network of research
centres with coordinated regional focus in
universities would meet this demand. These centres
should provide academic training for practitioners
in international development. Currently, the
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Ministry of Education already has a network of
centres of excellence in humanities and social
science disciplines through a competitive process,
and there is space for this process to be accelerated.
Enhance exchanges and collaborations among the
academic community, civil society and opinion leaders
in China and the developing world 
Though official and summit meetings have been
a cornerstone of relationships between China
and developing countries, at the same time,
scholars, civil society and other non-state actors
are becoming more important in shaping public
opinions and political decisions. At present,
exchanges and collaborations between Chinese
scholars and scholars from other countries and
civil societies are generally only made possible by
a third party. Greater engagement and
collaboration in the academic community and
civil society in the developing world is needed,
both in producing the research and information
resources that would benefit China’s aid
practitioners and entrepreneurs operating in
developing countries, but also in promoting
greater cross-cultural understanding between
China and Africa, and an opportunity to better
China’s international image in African societies.
Despite the global financial crisis, Chinese
leaders have reiterated China’s commitment to
Africa. As China is becoming a large and stable
donor internationally, it must learn how to
improve the institutional arrangements of its aid
system in order to maximise the positive impact
of its foreign aid and investment. This research
outlines the parallel strengths and weaknesses in
China’s current aid practices, and offers some
concrete recommendations for its future
evolution. However, as China’s aid activities grow
and the development landscape changes, there is
still a consistent need for future research on this
ever-shifting issue.
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Notes
* This article is based on a report comparing
India and China’s foreign aid practice,
partially supported by the International
Development Research Centre (IDRC). Able
research assistance was provided by Chenni
Xu, Hanzhi Yu and Robert Dietrich. The
author is particularly grateful to Yunnan
Chen, research officer at IDS, for her editing
work. Any errors, however, are the author’s.
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